Privilege Escalation via Insecure NFS Mounts

Sun, 26 Jul 2026 19:13:00 +0530

In this blog, I’ll walk through how I escalated my privileges from a low-privileged user to root on a remote server by abusing an insecurely configured NFS export (no_root_squash).

Prologue

“Control is an illusion.”
— Mr. Robot

NFS has a habit of trusting whoever knocks on the door — and trust, as always, is the real vulnerability.

Initial Foothold

At this stage I already had a shell as a regular, low-privileged user. The interesting part began while I was looking for a way up to root.

Enumerating NFS Exports

While enumerating running services, I noticed the machine was exposing an NFS service. NFS (Network File System) lets a server share directories over the network so clients can mount them as if they were local. The quickest way to see what a host is sharing is showmount:

`1`	`showmount -e <TARGET>`

One of the exported directories was shared with everyone (*). That alone was worth a closer look, so I wanted to confirm exactly how it was being exported.

Spotting the Misconfiguration

“People always make the best exploits.”
— Elliot Alderson, Mr. Robot

Since I already had a shell on the box, I read the export configuration directly from /etc/exports. The shared directory carried the no_root_squash option.

This single option is the whole ballgame. Normally NFS applies root_squash, which squashes a connecting root user (UID 0) down to the unprivileged nobody account — so being root on the client buys you nothing on the share. With no_root_squash, the server trusts the client’s UID as-is. If I’m root on my own machine, I’m effectively root on the share — including the ability to write root-owned files and set the SUID bit on them.
A human typed that word into a config file once and moved on. That’s the exploit.

Mounting the Export

I switched to my own machine, where I have full root, and mounted the vulnerable export locally:

`1`	`mount -t nfs -o rw,suid,soft,intr,nolock,exec SERVER_ADDRESS:SERVER_DIRECTORY LOCAL_MOUNT_DIRECTORY`

The share mounted without any authentication — NFSv3 doesn’t challenge the client, it simply trusts the source address and the UID it presents.

Planting a Root-Owned SUID Binary

With the share mounted and me sitting as root on my own box, I wrote a tiny C program that spawns a shell while preserving its privileges:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main() {
    setuid(0);
    setgid(0);
    system("/bin/bash");
    return 0;
}

I compiled it straight into the mounted share and made it a root-owned SUID binary:

1
2

gcc priv_esc.c
chmod 4777 a.out

Because of no_root_squash, the file lands on the server owned by root, and the SUID bit sticks.

Getting a Root Shell

Back in my original low-privileged shell on the target, the binary was now sitting in the exported directory — owned by root, with the SUID bit set. Executing it dropped me straight into a shell running as root:
uid=0(root) — full control of the server, earned from a single misconfigured export. No kernel exploit, no crash risk, nothing fragile. Just a trust boundary that was set too wide.

Attack Path

Started with a low-privileged shell on the target.
Enumerated NFS and found a writable export shared with everyone.
Confirmed the export used no_root_squash.
Mounted the export from a machine where I had root.
Planted a root-owned SUID binary in the share.
Executed it on the target to become root.

Mitigations

To prevent this type of attack, consider the following security best practices:

Never use no_root_squash: Stick to the default root_squash, and prefer all_squash to map every client UID to nobody unless there is a hard requirement otherwise.
Mount and export with nosuid: The nosuid option strips the effect of the SUID/SGID bits, so a planted binary can’t gain privileges.
Restrict exports to specific hosts: Never export to *. Pin each share to the exact IPs or subnets that legitimately need it.
Export read-only where possible: Use the ro option whenever write access isn’t required.
Prefer NFSv4 with Kerberos (sec=krb5): Move away from the trust-the-client model of NFSv3 to authenticated, identity-aware access.
Firewall NFS services: Restrict access to port 2049 and the rpcbind/portmapper ports so only trusted networks can reach the service.
Audit /etc/exports regularly: Treat any no_root_squash entry as a finding that must be justified or removed.

Nfs on Gill.Singh.A